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POLITICAL AND NON-POLITICAL SPEECH AND GUNS
Gregory P. Magarian*
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional rights depend on justifications. Some combination of theory, his-
tory, and practical reasoning needs to establish why and to what extent a given right
warrants legal protection. The justifications that courts and theorists articulate for
a given right determine the right’s breadth and the specific contours of its protection.
Justification has particular importance at the formative stage of a newly recognized
constitutional right. At present, courts are building doctrine around the Second
Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear Arms,”1 recognized as an individ-
ual right just over a decade ago in District of Columbia v. Heller.2 Accordingly, this
is an opportune time for considering what justifications might support that right.
Many advocates of a strong Second Amendment increasingly lament what they
see as courts’ insufficiently vigorous enforcement of the right to keep and bear arms.
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has complained repeatedly that courts have
“relegate[d] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”3 Advocates for gun
rights level the same charge.4 To put normative meat on that complaint’s positive
* Thomas and Karole Green Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. Thanks
to participants in the 2019 Symposium, Constitutional Rights: Intersections, Synergies, &
Conflicts, at the William and Mary Law School and especially to that symposium’s architect,
Tim Zick. Thanks as well to participants in the 2019 Symposium Heller at 10 at the University
of California–Hastings College of Law.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2 554 U.S. 570, 581, 589 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
742 (2010) (extending the individual Second Amendment right to apply against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
3 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); see also Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (lamenting “the treatment of the Second Amendment
as a disfavored right”); Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
4 See Ilya Shapiro & Matthew Larosiere, The Supreme Court Is Too Gun-Shy on the
Second Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the
-supreme-court-is-too-gun-shy-on-the-second-amendment-11546473290 [https://perma.cc
/85Q6-3RE3] (complaining about the “second-class treatment of the Second Amendment”);
John Yoo & James C. Phillips, The Second(-Class) Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 2018,
6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/supreme-court-second-amendment-rights/
[https://perma.cc/8PH9-NAWT] (“Far too often for too long, the Second Amendment has
been a second-class right, banished to the back of our constitutional bus.”). For a catalogue
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bones, and following their frequent tendency to press for stronger Second Amend-
ment rights by simple analogies to the First Amendment,5 gun rights advocates make
the specific claim that courts improperly enforce the First Amendment’s protections
of free expression6 more vigorously than the Second Amendment’s protection of the
right to keep and bear arms.7 I will call this argument—that the First Amendment pro-
vides the proper baseline for Second Amendment enforcement—the “parity premise.”
One salient way to analyze the parity premise is to consider the justifications
available for First and Second Amendment rights.8 Courts and scholars have offered
multiple and shifting justifications for the First Amendment’s expression protections.9
One familiar, potent justification for constitutional expressive freedom is that a healthy,
properly functioning democracy requires protections for speech that relates to demo-
cratic self-government.10 I will refer to that idea as the “political value justification”
for First Amendment rights. If the Second Amendment’s individual right to keep and
bear arms can be justified on similar political value terms, then the parity premise
would appear sound. In contrast, if no political value justification supports the Sec-
ond Amendment, then the parity premise requires some different grounding. Think-
ing about the political value justification casts alternative, non-political justifications
into sharper relief, suggesting which qualities might characterize viable alternatives.
of the “second-class right” claim in judicial opinions, legal briefs, and the media, see Eric Ruben
& Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1443, 1446–51 (2018).
5 See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81
TENN. L. REV. 417, 418–20 (2014). For an analysis and critique of gun rights advocates’ uses
of First Amendment analogies, see Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How
the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 61–65, 69–72 (2012).
6 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I. My discussion of First Amendment rights refers
collectively to the rights of speech, press, assembly, and petition. It does not extend to the
Religion Clauses. See id.
7 See, e.g., Charles C.W. Cooke, Second Amendment Gets Second-Class Treatment,
NRA: AM. 1ST FREEDOM (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.americas1stfreedom.org/articles/2018
/2/9/second-amendment-gets-second-class-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/9A99-ZK8V] (“[W]ere
the Second Amendment treated in the same way as is the First Amendment, even the gener-
ally non-controversial regulations on the acquisition, transfer and bearing of firearms would
be obviated.”).
8 This Article does not address the empirical question whether courts in fact enforce the
Second Amendment less vigorously than the First Amendment. For a refutation of the “second-
class right” claim, see JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 185 (2018). For a thorough
empirical examination of lower courts’ Second Amendment decisions, see Ruben & Blocher,
supra note 4, at 1443, 1446–51.
9 Leading surveys of justifications for First Amendment speech rights include VINCENT
BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 2012); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
10 See infra notes 14–27 and accompanying text.
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This Article contends that the political value justification for First Amendment
rights cannot be adapted to the Second Amendment.11 It then distills some central
qualities of alternative, non-political justifications for First Amendment rights and
explains why the Second Amendment right cannot draw support from similar non-
political justifications.12 My analysis provides strong reason to believe that the parity
premise is unsound. The Article closes by suggesting how courts might enforce the
Second Amendment more modestly and justifiably to protect not a substantive right
but rather an equal right to keep and bear arms.13
I. POLITICAL VALUE AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRST AND
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The First Amendment: Political Speech
Political value justifications for the First Amendment’s expressive freedom pro-
tections have a long and well-established pedigree. First Amendment theorists from
Justice Louis Brandeis14 through Alexander Meiklejohn15 and Judge Robert Bork16
have long contended that the practical demands of democratic politics yield the best,
perhaps the only, valid justification for constraining the government’s power to regulate
expression. In Meiklejohn’s classic formulation, self-governing citizens’ need for
access to all relevant political information compels nearly absolute First Amendment
protection, but only for political speech.17 Later theorists have offered more inclusive
variations on the political value justification, invoking democratic self-government to
explain the First Amendment’s purpose but not to limit its protective scope.18 The
11 See discussion infra Part I.
12 See discussion infra Part II.
13 See discussion infra Part III.
14 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (describing
“[t]hose who won our independence” as believing “that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government”).
15 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
16 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 20–21 (1971).
17 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, at 24–28 (positing “the traditional American town meet-
ing” as an exemplar of the role expressive freedom plays in democratic self-government).
18 See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 125–26 (2002) (concep-
tualizing the First Amendment’s protection of a free press as instrumental for democracy);
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 41–42 (2010) (arguing that the constitutional structure supports an understanding of
the First Amendment as protecting a collective right of democratic self-determination); ROBERT
C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 272–74 (1995)
(positing the First Amendment as a protection for democratic public discourse and the boundaries
of that discourse as necessarily contestable).
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logic of political value justification entails particular emphasis on broad participation
in public discourse and on protecting the capacity of dissenters to advocate political
and social change—a combination of values I have called “dynamic diversity.”19
Political value justification has played an important role at every stage in the
development of First Amendment doctrine. The nineteenth century controversy over
the government’s attempt to silence political opposition through the Alien and Sedition
Acts formed the prototype of First Amendment law.20 Justice Brandeis, along with
his colleague Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, built the template for First Amend-
ment rights in a series of dissents and concurrences where the Supreme Court upheld
convictions of anti-war protesters and left-wing activists.21 New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, the cornerstone of the Warren Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence,
protected a political advertisement in the name of making public debate “uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open.”22 The Court justified speech protections for a range of
speakers including public employees,23 schoolchildren,24 and flag burners25 based on
those speakers’ varied contributions to public political debates. More recently, the
Roberts Court has emphasized political value to underwrite its First Amendment cru-
sade against campaign finance regulation26 and its protection of vitriolic protests at
military funerals.27 Political value justification forms a crucial part, perhaps the domi-
nant part, in judicial and academic explanations for constitutional expressive freedom.
Even as political value has provided a paradigmatic justification for constitutional
speech protection, political potency also defines important limits on that protection—a
19 See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMEND-
MENT, at xvi–xx (2017) (defining and explaining dynamic diversity).
20 See generally TERRI DIANE HALPERIN, THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS OF 1798:
TESTING THE CONSTITUTION (2016) (examining the Alien and Sedition Acts and the contro-
versy that caused).
21 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
22 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
23 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (establishing presumptive First
Amendment protection when a public employee speaks “as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern”).
24 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–11 (1969) (estab-
lishing presumptive First Amendment protection for public school students’ speech where
students wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War).
25 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (establishing First Amendment pro-
tection for flag burning performed as part of a political protest).
26 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (emphasizing, in establishing
First Amendment protection for corporate electoral expenditures, the political importance of
corporate voices).
27 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–58 (2011) (positing the “public concern”
character of military funeral protests as the basis for a First Amendment limit on tort liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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sort of First Amendment anti-matter. Paladins of political stability have warned of
the First Amendment as a “suicide pact,” a liberal democratic weapon that might doom
liberal democracy itself.28 Likewise, defenders of expressive freedom have some-
times suggested that First Amendment protection should hinge on the incapacity of
speech to bring about actual change.29 The Supreme Court initiated First Amendment
law by letting the federal and state governments punish a succession of political
dissenters.30 That tendency reached its nadir during the Cold War, when the Court
upheld federal convictions of Communist Party leaders for the crime of teaching and
advocating communist ideas.31 The Court eventually reversed course, announcing
strong First Amendment protection for any political advocacy short of incitements
to imminent violence.32 Our present, seemingly boundless “War on Terror” has swung
the pendulum back in a restrictive direction, apparent in the Roberts Court’s approval
of a federal bar on activists’ efforts to teach foreign terrorist organizations about
nonviolent conflict resolution.33 The incitement doctrine’s focus on imminent action
and the Court’s intermittent queasiness about vigorous political dissent reflects what
I’ll call the “flashpoint problem.” Courts protect challenges to the political status quo
as long as those challenges hold the form of speech. At some point, however, speech
reaches a flashpoint that causes action—in extreme cases, physical insurrection. The
incitement doctrine aims to protect political speech up to the flashpoint while en-
abling government restrictions past the flashpoint.34
Despite the importance of political speech in First Amendment theory, political
value has never prevailed as an exclusive justification for a robust First Amendment.
People value freedom to participate not just in discourse about democratic self-
government but also in discourse about art, science, sex, recreation, commerce, and
more.35 Professor Meiklejohn eventually broadened his strict political conception of
28 The “suicide pact” admonition appears to have originated with Justice Robert Jackson.
See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
29 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man” did not meet
the “clear and present danger” standard for punishing speech).
30 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 367–72 (1927) (affirming a conviction under
a state criminal syndicalism statute for advocating violent overthrow of the government);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664–68 (1925) (affirming another state criminal syndicalism
conviction); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–53 (1919) (affirming a federal conviction
for advocating resistance to military recruiting and enlistment); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621–24
(affirming a federal conviction for advocating interference with munitions production).
31 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501–02 (1951) (plurality opinion).
32 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam).
33 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28–32 (2010).
34 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
35 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22–23 (1973) (“[F]or in the area of freedom of
speech and press the Courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression.”).
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First Amendment protection to include artistic and cultural expression.36 Judge Bork,
writing at the outset of a half-century (and counting) of conservative judicial ascen-
dency, insisted that only a political justification could maintain “neutral” judicial legiti-
macy and prevent unprincipled judicial expansion of First Amendment rights.37 His
fellow conservatives, however, have ignored his admonition. The Supreme Court in the
past half century has extended First Amendment protection to commercial advertis-
ing,38 pornography,39 self-serving lies,40 and numerous other forms of non-political
speech.41 The Roberts Court—despite the political pieties of its campaign finance
jurisprudence—has shaped a First Amendment far more sensitive to commercial profit
than to political dissent.42 The political value justification for expressive freedom
retains force, but the evolution of First Amendment law has required additional,
non-political justifications.
B. The Second Amendment: Resistance to Tyranny
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms historically rests on a
political value theory with striking parallels to the political value justification for
First Amendment speech protections. The theory holds that the Second Amendment
protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of resisting the federal
government should it devolve into tyranny.43 The political value justification for
Second Amendment rights has strong foundations in the Second Amendment’s text
and history.44 Textually, the Second Amendment’s preamble—“A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”—animates the amendment’s
declarative clause: “the right of the People to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.”45 As I have argued elsewhere, the textual structure and substance compel
36 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, at 117.
37 See Bork, supra note 16, at 20–28.
38 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771–72 (1976) (establishing First Amendment protection for commercial speech).
39 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332–34 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (striking down a municipal ban on certain nonobscene pornography).
40 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715–23 (2012) (plurality opinion) (striking
down a federal statute that criminalized false claims of military honors).
41 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804–05 (2011) (striking down
a California statute that barred minors from renting violent video games). For a more extensive
discussion of First Amendment protection for non-political speech, see Gregory P. Magarian,
Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech,
90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 251–81 (2005).
42 I develop this argument in MAGARIAN, supra note 19, at 33–64.
43 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 47
(1998).
44 See Magarian, supra note 5, at 83–87.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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a collectivist understanding of the right to keep and bear arms, and the most apt
collectivist justification is resistance to tyranny.46 A formidable body of legal and
historical scholarship makes a convincing case that the Second Amendment in fact
emerged from a civic republican vision of popular resistance to tyrannical govern-
ment.47 In David Williams’ compelling account, the amendment’s Framers meant
to enable “the body of the people” to rise up collectively in arms should the federal
government become oppressive.48
The most intellectually potent challenge to the political value theory of Second
Amendment rights has come from one of that theory’s leading architects. Akhil
Amar builds a convincing historical argument that the imperative to enable resis-
tance to tyranny animated the Second Amendment.49 Amar proceeds to argue that
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally changed the constitu-
tional meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.50 In his account, the Framers of
that Reconstruction Amendment were liberals, not civic republicans.51 Changed cir-
cumstances and evolved ideals caused them to care less about the people’s capacity
to overthrow tyranny by force of arms.52 Instead, the Reconstruction generation cared
about personal self-defense, particularly African Americans’ capacity to protect them-
selves against racist violence.53 Given the theoretical shift wrought by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Amar argues, a proper contemporary understanding of the Second
Amendment should recognize personal self-defense as the primary focus of the
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.54
Amar’s account carries considerable historical force, but his argument runs into
trouble when it turns to legal analysis. The heart of the problem lies in the Second
Amendment’s preamble. However archaic the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers
may have considered the civic republican ideal of popular resistance to tyranny, the
Second Amendment’s Framers wrote that ideal into the constitutional text. The Four-
teenth Amendment left the preamble in place and its meaning in force. Amar makes
strong arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment compels changes in how we
construe other constitutional rights.55 None of those other rights, however, comes
46 See Magarian, supra note 5, at 83–87.
47 Leading elaborations of this insight include AMAR, supra note 43, at 46–59; SAUL
CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN
CONTROL IN AMERICA 3–5 (2006); DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SEC-
OND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 9 (2003).
48 WILLIAMS, supra note 47, at 46–49 (explaining the constitutional conception of the
citizen militia as consisting of the body of the people).
49 See AMAR, supra note 43, at 47–48.
50 See id. at 258–59.
51 See id. at 258.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 259.
54 See id. at 258–60.
55 See id. at 231–57, 268–83 (examining changes to the freedoms of expression and religion).
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with any textual anchor like the Second Amendment’s preamble. For example, we
can fairly unmoor the Establishment Clause from its apparent original purpose of
protecting state religious establishments against federal encroachment, and instead
incorporate that clause against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.56
Nothing in the First Amendment’s text bars that shift. The Second Amendment’s
text does not work the same way.
Just as the preamble’s presence in the Second Amendment undercuts Amar’s
argument, so does the absence of any language about personal self-defense. No
principle of constitutional interpretation supports enforcing a norm of personal self-
defense when that norm gets no mention in either the original or amended constitu-
tional text. “[W]here, precisely,” Amar asks, “does the Fourteenth Amendment work
its noteworthy rewriting of the arms right and the inscription of the civil rights–political
rights distinction?”57 He never gives a specific answer, let alone a satisfying one.
Highlighting a Reconstruction-era political tract, he proclaims: “[I]f we listen closely,
we can . . . hear in these words the subtle privatization of the Second Amendment.”
Rhetorical echoes, however, aren’t constitutional law. Presumably having considered
this problem, Amar later suggested that a constitutional right of armed personal self-
defense might emerge not from the incorporated Second Amendment but organically
from the Fourteenth Amendment clause that protects “privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States”58 against encroachments by the states.59 That approach—
using a nearly dead constitutional provision60 to protect an unenumerated revision
of an enumerated right—would be unprecedented and problematic. Other advocates
of a self-defense right have shown little interest in trading the Second Amendment’s
specific but problematic text for whatever may lie behind door number Fourteen.
Beyond its textual problems, Amar’s argument for a constitutional right of indi-
vidual self-defense also raises substantive concerns. While he musters strong evidence
that the Reconstruction Congress was concerned about African Americans’ physical
safety from racist attackers,61 a wide chasm separates that concern from the conclu-
sion that any United States government would constitutionalize a deliberate regime
of black violence against white men. The river of our history roars against that racially
progressive narrative.62 Even if we accept Amar’s historical premise, the political
valence of personal self-defense has changed markedly since Reconstruction. In our
56 See id. at 246–54 (discussing the Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment).
57 Id. at 259.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
59 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 907–11.
60 The Supreme Court eviscerated the Privileges or Immunities Clause in The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76–77 (1873).
61 See Amar, supra note 59, at 899–900.
62 See generally, e.g., TERENCE FINNEGAN, A DEED SO ACCURSED: LYNCHING IN MISSISSIPPI
AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1881–1940 (2013).
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era, political veneration of armed self-defense often carries an unmistakable odor of
white fear about supposed black crime against white victims.63 We should not take
a doctrine intended to protect African Americans and redeploy it in a way that might
serve to excuse violence against them.64
Where Amar’s intellectually formidable attack on the political value justification
for Second Amendment rights failed, the Supreme Court’s considerably weaker at-
tack in District of Columbia v. Heller succeeded, because the Court has the power
to inscribe its mistakes and biases in law. In analyzing the Second Amendment’s
preamble, the Heller majority acknowledged (even as it de-emphasized) the anti-
tyranny theory.65 However, the Court proceeded both to relegate the preamble to
“explanatory” status66 and to insist that the Second Amendment’s Framers cared more
about personal self-defense than about any function of the “well regulated Militia.”67
Neither of those moves makes much sense. As to the preamble, why would the authors
of the Bill of Rights provide an explanation for the right to keep and bear arms—as
they did for no other right—without intending or believing that the explanation
would have some bearing on that right’s legal scope and force?68 As to the historical
context, no substantial evidence supports a personal self-defense justification for the
Second Amendment, while copious evidence supports the anti-tyranny justifica-
tion.69 Heller exemplifies the tendency of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
63 See WILLIAMS, supra note 47, at 183–85, 188 (documenting repeated racist appeals
related to self-defense by National Rifle Association leaders Wayne LaPierre and Charlton
Heston); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 228–30, 232–33 (2008) (documenting racialized rhetoric about crime
and self-defense in the recent gun rights movement).
64 The Supreme Court has turned other racially progressive constitutional principles toward
racially regressive legal ends. See Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I ), 509 U.S. 630, 630–32 (1993) (in-
voking the Equal Protection Clause bar on racial discrimination to restrict the government’s
power to implement race-conscious remedies that increase opportunities for members of historic-
ally disadvantaged racial groups); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267
(1978) (plurality opinion) (same).
65 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 597 (2008) (listing resistance to tyranny
third among three ways in which the Framers thought of the militia as “necessary to the security
of a free State”); id. at 600 (recognizing the Second Amendment as “assur[ing] the existence
of a ‘citizens’ militia’ as a safeguard against tyranny”).
66 See id. at 598–600 (describing the subordinate, explanatory relationship of the Second
Amendment’s preamble to the operative clause); see also MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE:
WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 25–26 (2007) (arguing that,
under “[t]he best individual-rights interpretation” of the Second Amendment, the preamble
“explains why the Constitution contains the right . . . but doesn’t impose conditions on exer-
cising the right”).
67 See U.S. CONST. amend. II; Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (dismissing the preamble as rele-
vant only to “the [Second Amendment] right’s codification” and calling self-defense “the central
component of the right itself”).
68 See Magarian, supra note 5, at 78–79.
69 See David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of
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Roberts to resolve constitutional rights disputes by reference to history and tradition.70
The majority’s reasoning vividly illustrates the malleability of that approach.71
The Heller Court’s short-circuiting of the political value justification for the
individual right to keep and bear arms is as understandable as it is artless. The trouble
with the political value justification for the First Amendment is that, in the view of
many or most people, it does not go far enough in protecting expression.72 In sharp
contrast, the trouble with the political value justification for the Second Amendment
is that—in the view of just about everyone, including many advocates for gun rights—
it goes too far in protecting guns.73 The anti-tyranny justification for the right to
keep and bear arms, in present circumstances, presents at least three problems.
First, armed resistance to tyranny presents a literally weaponized variation on the
First Amendment flashpoint problem. Guns pose a far more immediate threat of vio-
lence in most contexts than words ever do. True, an unfired gun produces no more
physical damage than a pamphlet or an utterance. The ordinary operation of speech,
however, does not entail even potential violence.74 Words do what they do without di-
rectly causing any physical damage.75 Guns, in contrast, are designed for violence.
Their power remains latent until it causes physical harm. Policing the political First
Amendment’s flashpoint boundary is challenging.76 Policing the political Second
Amendment’s flashpoint boundary risks catastrophe. We might lower the stakes of the
Second Amendment flashpoint by restricting the sorts of arms that people have a consti-
tutional right to keep and bear, but that solution—the approach of the Heller Court—
sells out the anti-tyranny justification entirely.77 If we want an armed citizenry capable
of bringing down a rogue U.S. government, then all Americans should have a right
to keep and bear military weapons.78 Almost nobody appears to want that.
Guns, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 652–53 (2008) (sharply criticizing the Heller Court’s ahistorical
sublimation of the anti-tyranny justification in favor of the self-defense justification).
70 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 583–84, 587–88 (2014) (using a tradition-
based analysis to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to a municipal legislative prayer);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010) (using a tradition-based analysis to
sustain a free speech challenge to a federal ban on videos that depict animal cruelty).
71 For a critique of the Roberts Court’s tradition-based methodology in the free speech
context, see MAGARIAN, supra note 19, at 13–15.
72 See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
73 Cf. Megan Brenan, Ten Takeaways About American’s Views of Guns, GALLUP (May 2,
2018), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/233627/ten-takeaways-americans
-views-guns.aspx [https://perma.cc/HN33-KY5A]; Lydia Saad, Gallup’s Guide to U.S. Public
Opinion on Guns, GALLUP (Aug. 5, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/262724
/gallup-guide-public-opinion-guns.aspx [https://perma.cc/W7AM-AVPX].
74 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 55 (1989).
75 See, e.g., id. at 54–56 (distinguishing speech from conduct on the ground that speech
ordinarily operates in a nonviolent and noncoercive manner).
76 See cases cited supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
77 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28 (acknowledging the government’s power to ban private
ownership of military weapons).
78 See Williams, supra note 69, at 660–62.
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Second, the political Second Amendment presents a collective action problem.
Expression is pluralist and interactive.79 Numerous people, groups, and institutions
are constantly engaged in political (and for that matter cultural, scientific, and com-
mercial) discourse. The multifarious, multidirectional character of communication
is part of what gives speech its political value. Ideas bounce around our political eco-
system in unpredictable directions, recombining and mutating as they reach different
audiences and undergo fresh iterations. As a result, speech constantly fuels political
change in numerous large and small ways. In contrast, the anti-tyranny justification
for the Second Amendment contemplates one cataclysmic political goal: armed revo-
lution.80 To accomplish that goal, the anti-tyranny justification demands a sort of
concerted action that no one seriously believes possible.81 The Second Amendment’s
preamble conceptualizes the “Militia” as congruent with “the people” in the Amend-
ment’s declarative clause.82 The Framers believed that the people as a collective would
recognize tyranny and would then rise up in the form of the militia to defeat tyranny
by force of arms.83 For the Second Amendment to serve its defining political pur-
pose, today’s far larger and more heterogeneous society would need to find some
way of reconstituting the real or imagined civic unity of the revolutionary era.84
Finally, the political Second Amendment presents a problem of incongruence.
The people likeliest to be armed are the people who would seem least inclined to
raise those arms against a tyrannical government. In our current political culture, with
its sharp polarizations along lines of race, sex, and class, gun owners predominantly
share the demographic characteristics of the people who hold the most political
power—white,85 male,86 and relatively affluent.87 In addition, most gun owners are
politically conservative.88 Substantial social science evidence indicates that political
79 See BAKER, supra note 74, at 54–55.
80 See Williams, supra note 69, at 658–60.
81 See id. at 660 (“The outcome of Heller is thus strange but clear: the people have the right
to own arms, and to use them in resistance, but not to prepare before the fact for resistance.
Apparently they will just spontaneously turn out.”).
82 See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
83 See Williams, supra note 69, at 668.
84 See WILLIAMS, supra note 47, at 295–301 (discussing the viability of redeeming the
founding-era ideal of “the people”).
85 According to a Pew Research Center report on gun ownership among U.S. adults—using
that report’s terminology—36% of Whites, 24% of Blacks, and 15% of Hispanics personally
owned guns in 2017. See KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., AMERICA’S COMPLEX RELATION-
SHIP WITH GUNS 18 (2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/the-demographics-of
-gun-ownership/ [https://perma.cc/8XWG-74CY].
86 See id. (stating that 39% of men and 22% of women personally own guns).
87 See Share of Households That Own a Firearm in the United States in 2019, by Household
Income, STATISTA (2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/625177/firearm-ownership-rate-by
-household-income-us/ [https://perma.cc/V5JK-ZBSA] (finding the following correlations
between household income and percentage of households that owned guns in 2014: less than
$25,000, 18.2%; $25,000–$49,999, 32.1%; $50,000–$89,999, 41.8%; $90,000 and above, 44%).
88 See PARKER ET AL., supra note 85, at 12 (indicating that 44% of Republicans and
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conservatives tend to view authority more sympathetically than nonconservatives do.89
Thus, the people with the greatest capacity to take up arms against the government—
which is not to say any substantial capacity—have strong affinities and tendencies
that would discourage them from doing so. This incongruence critique, of course,
indulges several broad generalizations. In finer grain, our political community in-
cludes powerful women of color, progressive gun owners, anti-authoritarian conser-
vatives, and people whose politics do not track polarities of race, sex, or class. Still,
the anti-tyranny justification for the right to keep and bear arms requires armed re-
sistance to tyranny on a mass scale, and that premise gives broad generalizations ana-
lytic weight. Thus, even aside from the flashpoint and collective action problems,
we have strong reasons to doubt that the Second Amendment could facilitate the
recognition and overthrow of a tyrannical U.S. government.
The problems with the anti-tyranny argument for the individual right to keep
and bear arms mean that the parity premise—the view that courts should enforce
First and Second Amendment rights with the same vigor—cannot rest on a political
value justification. Instead, the parity premise needs support from some non-political
justification. First Amendment law and theory can help us to identify and evaluate
alternative, non-political justifications for the Second Amendment.
II. NON-POLITICAL VALUE AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRST AND
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The First Amendment: Social Relation Speech
First Amendment law’s rejection of a strict political value limitation reflects an
important insight that most speech concerns not political processes, but rather what
we can broadly call social relations—interactions between and among private indi-
viduals and entities—and that this mass of social relation speech has great value.
Republican-leaning independents own guns, while 20% of Democrats and Democratic leaning
independents own guns); see also Kim Parker, Among Gun Owners, NRA Members Have a
Unique Set of Views and Experiences, PEW RES. CTR. (July 5, 2017), https://www.pewre
search.org/fact-tank/2017/07/05/among-gun-owners-nra-members-have-a-unique-set-of-views
-and-experiences/ [https://perma.cc/NL83-PKAP] (stating that 61% of all gun owners are Repub-
licans or Republican leaners).
89 Studies that link conservatism and authoritarianism include William F. Stone & Laurence
D. Smith, Authoritarianism: Left and Right, in STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS: THE AUTHORI-
TARIAN PERSONALITY TODAY 14 (William F. Stone et al. eds., 1993); John T. Jost et al.,
Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 339 (2003). Critics
have argued that measures used to establish the conservative-authoritarian relationship are
predisposed to find that relationship. See Jesse Singal, How Social Science Might Be Mis-
understanding Conservatives, INTELLIGENCER (July 15, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer
/2018/07/how-social-science-might-be-misunderstanding-conservatives.html [https://perma
.cc/WWH9-XEWW] (discussing critiques of studies that find a relationship between conserva-
tism and authoritarianism).
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Two familiar justifications generally support the expansion of First Amendment
rights beyond speech with political value to encompass social relation speech. First,
in Justice Holmes’ classic formulation, constitutional speech protection provides
“the best test of truth” by measuring “the power of [a] thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market.”90 The essence of Holmes’ truth theory prefigures
the logic of Meiklejohn’s political value justification for speech protection: If people
have access to more information, they can use it to achieve better outcomes. Holmes,
though, does not limit that logic to matters of politics. Second, constitutional speech
protection can promote various conceptions of individual autonomy and personal
fulfillment.91 I will call these the “truth” and “autonomy” justifications for protecting
social relation speech.
The greatest strength of the truth and autonomy justifications, compared to a po-
litical value justification for speech protection, lies in their breadth. Both justifications
encompass the full range of subject matters in social relation speech. The breadth of
these justifications, however, also presents a problem. All human activity, expressive
and otherwise, can help us discover truth and promote our self-fulfillment and auto-
nomy.92 If truth and autonomy values can justify constitutional speech protection,
they would also seem to require protecting nonexpressive activity that promotes those
values. Free speech theory deals with this problem by positing an essential, categori-
cal distinction between speech and action.93 Distinguishing expression from action,
however, becomes very hard very quickly. Expression is a form of action; all action
has expressive content. Inevitably, then, the speech-action distinction requires norma-
tive content.94 The normative qualification of protected speech is complicated,
contentious, and multifaceted. I will focus on two criteria that appear important for
how and why First Amendment law draws the lines it does between protected social
relation speech and unprotected action.
First, the law appears to view social relation speech as more likely than nonexpres-
sive activity to do more social good than harm. I will call this the “benefit criterion.”
Empirically measuring the costs and benefits of social relation speech is likely im-
possible. For better and worse, though, First Amendment doctrine generally rests not
on empirical testing but on broad normative presumptions.95 The presumption be-
hind the benefit criterion—that expression generally does more good and less harm
than nonexpressive action—is both facially reasonable and integral to First Amend-
ment doctrine. Of course speech can cause harm, and First Amendment law likely
90 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
91 See generally BAKER, supra note 74 (articulating and defending a “liberty theory” of
constitutional speech protection).
92 See STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING,
TOO 102–05 (1994).
93 See Magarian, supra note 5, at 55.
94 See FISH, supra note 92, at 103–05.
95 See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 3–4.
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underestimates the extent of that harm.96 Expression, however, is essential for virtually
every socially desirable process and interaction.97 Speech brings societal benefits in
a dizzying variety of ways, such as forming personal bonds, generating artistic and
cultural materials, and educating. All of these benefits from speech also produce sub-
stantial positive externalities. If we want a flourishing society, then we must want
substantial freedom for social relation speech.
In First Amendment law, virtually every boundary that separates protected speech
from unprotected speech—and by extension from nonexpressive conduct—can
readily be understood as grounded in an accounting of benefits and harms.98 The
categorical doctrines that deny protection to fighting words,99 obscenity,100 and defa-
mation;101 the interest balancing that lets the government regulate even presumptively
protected speech for sufficiently strong reasons102—all of these doctrines, again for
better and worse, appear to set First Amendment boundaries based on free expres-
sion’s relative benefits.
Second, the capacity to express and receive information is one to which most
people and groups start out, prior to social and legal interventions, with roughly
equal access. I will call this the “equality criterion.” Obvious and important limits exist
to the equality criterion’s salience for the First Amendment. Some people can speak
more effectively than others, and some people can process information better. Educa-
tion dramatically affects people’s capacity to participate effectively in public discourse,
and some people can buy much better education than others.103 Likewise, technology
96 See generally Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT.
REV. 81 (2011) (discussing the role of courts in downplaying the harms of speech).
97 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 964, 965 (1978).
98 The Supreme Court’s earliest decision of a free speech claim created the prototype for
this benefit-harm formulation in letting the government punish speech that presents a “clear
and present danger” of bringing about some legally cognizable harm. Schenck v. United States,
247 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
99 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining the unprotected
speech category of “fighting words” as “utterances [that] are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”).
100 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (letting states ban certain sexually explicit
expression but stating a First Amendment exception for expression with “serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value”).
101 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that, because of
the public’s interest in robust debate on matters of public concern, the First Amendment lets
public officials recover tort damages for defamatory speech only where the publication reflects
“actual malice”).
102 See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486–92 (2014) (holding that a state’s
restriction on speech around abortion clinics restricted more speech than necessary to achieve
the government’s legitimate interests in public safety and ensuring access to clinics).
103 See Lindsey Cook, U.S. Education: Still Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
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provides powerful tools for amplifying voices and gathering more information, and
some people can buy more powerful speech-amplifying and information-gathering
technology than others.104 My modest claim is that the capacity for what First Amend-
ment law counts as speech is in general more broadly accessible than the capacity for
what the law discounts as nonexpressive action. Doing most things in an effective or
rewarding manner requires, from the outset, physical strength, material resources, or
both. Whatever nonexpressive activities any of us can or cannot do effectively, the vast
majority of us are born with roughly the same capacities to speak and listen. These
shared capacities can, and often do, enable reasonably fair arguments between the
otherwise weak and strong.
Certain aspects of First Amendment law promote expressive equality. The public
forum doctrine, notwithstanding its many flaws, flows from the imperative to maintain
a measure of equality in speakers’ and listeners’ access to expressive capacities.105
The bar on wholesale closures of expressive media reflects the same tendency, es-
pecially when courts recognize the particular importance of low-cost expressive
media.106 One way to understand First Amendment law’s allowances of punishments
for incitements107 and fighting words108 is that those modes of expression effectively
cross over into the realm of unprotected action when they succeed in leveraging gen-
erally accessible rhetorical power to foment generally inaccessible physical coercion.
In Justice Brandeis’s formulation: “If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”109 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court since the 1970s has increasingly turned First Amendment law into a counter-
egalitarian force, even in the non-political sphere. Free speech doctrine increasingly
underprotects underfunded and socially marginal speakers110 while overprotecting
REP. (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/01/28/us
-education-still-separate-and-unequal [https://perma.cc/H5C4-SPU3].
104 See generally KAREN MOSSBERGER ET AL., VIRTUAL INEQUALITY: BEYOND THE DIGITAL
DIVIDE (2003).
105 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 556–58 (1965) (invoking the First Amendment
to strike down a state’s arbitrary application to civil rights protesters of a statutory restriction
on obstructing a public sidewalk).
106 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) (emphasizing, in sustaining a
First Amendment challenge to a broad municipal ban on residential window signs, the low cost
of signs as a communication medium).
107 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (imposing a First
Amendment bar on punishment of advocacy “except where such advocacy is directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
108 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–74 (1942) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a conviction for shouting epithets and insults at another person).
109 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
110 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 303–05 (2012) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to a federal copyright law that removed certain works from the public domain).
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wealthy and powerful speakers.111 From the standpoint of the equality premise, this
legal creation and exacerbation of expressive inequalities represents a distortion of
how constitutional expressive freedom should work.
B. The Second Amendment: Personal Self-Defense
The Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller proclaimed personal self-
defense “the core lawful purpose” protected by the individual Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms.112 I have contended that the self-defense justification for
the Second Amendment right does not make much sense based on the constitutional
text and the Second Amendment’s historical context.113 Whatever the force of that
critique, Heller is the law. Heller also echoes public opinion polling that shows most
people in the United States favor an individual right to keep and bear arms,114 a con-
fluence that gun rights supporters often posit as salient for constitutional law.115 The
question for evaluating the parity premise is whether the value of individual self-
defense provides a credible alternative to the anti-tyranny value as a basis for vigorous
judicial enforcement of the Second Amendment.
The truth and autonomy justifications for First Amendment rights cannot directly
support constitutional protection for the right to keep and bear arms or for any other
nonexpressive activity. Those justifications work for constitutional expressive free-
dom only because First Amendment law draws a conceptual distinction between
speech and action.116 If that distinction means anything at a descriptive level, it must
mean that keeping and bearing arms is action rather than speech.117 The benefit and
111 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1,1–2 (1986)
(sustaining a First Amendment challenge to a state law that required a public utility to include
in its mailings to customers a consumer advocacy group’s messages).
112 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008).
113 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
114 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans in Agreement with Supreme Court on Gun Rights,
GALLUP (June 26, 2008), https://news.gallup.com/poll/108394/americans-agreement-supreme
-court-gun-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/4XCR-XFFD] (reporting polling data at the time the
Supreme Court decided Heller that seven in ten respondents believed the Second Amendment
protected an individual right to keep and bear arms and that a similar percentage opposed a
legal ban on handguns). Public sentiment appears to have held steady. See PARKER ET AL.,
supra note 85, at 61 (reporting that 72% of U.S. adults in 2017 believed that “most people” or
“almost everyone” should be legally allowed to own guns).
115 See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Response, How to Stop Worrying
and Learn to Love the Second Amendment: A Reply to Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV.
89, 99 (2013) (praising the Heller Court for having “finally caught up with public opinion” and
for “ratif[ying] a popular constitutional understanding” as to the desirability of constitutional
protection for an individual Second Amendment right focused on armed self-defense). For
a critique of this “popular constitutionalism” approach to the Second Amendment, see Siegel,
supra note 63, at 191–95.
116 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
117 See Magarian, supra note 5, at 55.
2019] POLITICAL AND NON-POLITICAL SPEECH AND GUNS 445
equality criteria, however, provide normative grounds for distinguishing speech from
action.118 Those same criteria might underwrite justifications for constitutionally
protecting categories of nonexpressive conduct like armed self-defense. In order to
figure out whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms can rest on
anything like the same sort of non-political justifications that underwrite First
Amendment protection for non-political speech, this section considers whether the
Heller self-defense justification for the right to keep and bear arms can satisfy the
benefit and equality criteria.
1. The Benefit Criterion
I suggested above that the First Amendment’s broad protection for social rela-
tion speech draws normative force from our legal culture’s assumption that free
expression brings greater social benefits than social harms.119 The benefit criterion
seems very difficult to square with the basic reality of firearms. Expression, as noted
above, is integral to virtually every sort of societal interaction. Despite the wide range
of good and bad purposes it can serve, speech is essentially constructive. Guns, in
contrast, are essentially destructive. The purpose of guns is to cause physical damage.
Gun deaths and injuries impose a wide range of societal costs, while guns can bring
only a narrow range of societal benefits.
Empirical inquiries about the social costs and benefits of guns are conceptually
difficult and politically contentious,120 though perhaps easier to conceive than the
same kinds of inquiries about speech. Still, the claim that guns bring net benefits to
society seems implausible, and I know of no serious attempt to defend that claim
empirically. Empirical evidence supports the claim that guns impose high social costs.
One study estimates the annual cost of gun violence in the United States at $229
billion, the vast majority from indirect costs associated with gun victims’ diminished
quality of life and lost wages.121 Another study estimates the annual cost of gun deaths
alone at more than $300 billion.122 The real cost of gun violence may greatly exceed
those numbers, given the broad dispersion of guns’ harmful consequences.123
118 See supra notes 95–104.
119 See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
120 See TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 75, 79–85 (expressing strong pessimism about the
capacity of social science research to resolve questions about wise gun policy).
121 See The True Cost of Gun Violence in America, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 15, 2015), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/04/true-cost-of-gun-violence-in-america/ [https://perma
.cc/AAP7-7Q3Z] (reporting results of a study by public health researcher Ted Miller).
122 See Timothy M. Smith, Quantifying the Social Cost of Firearms: A New Approach to Gun
Control, CONVERSATION (July 12, 2016, 8:56 PM), http://theconversation.com/quantifying-the-so
cial-cost-of-firearms-a-new-approach-to-gun-control-62148 [https://perma.cc/JN83-3PDB].
123 See David Hemenway, Costs of Firearm Violence: How You Measure Things Matters,
in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF VIOLENCE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 60, 61–62 (2012)
(positing broad, diffuse indirect costs of firearm homicides).
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The major claim for the social benefits of guns, manifest in Heller, is that guns
enable self-defense against crime.124 Testing that claim presents steep methodologi-
cal challenges.125 The most recent academic study on the efficacy of armed self-
defense, an analysis of data from the National Crime Victimization Survey for the
period 2007–2011, shows that victims of violent and property crimes used guns in
self-defense in less than one percent of instances where proximity to the attacker
made armed self-defense possible.126 Victims were injured after using guns self-
defensively at the same rate as victims who used other protective strategies, such as
running away, struggling, trying to attract attention, or using a different sort of wea-
pon.127 Self-defensive gun users in property crimes lost property at a substantially
lower rate than users of other protective strategies but at a slightly higher rate than
self-defensive users of weapons other than guns.128 Overall, the study’s authors found
“little evidence that [self-defensive gun use] is uniquely beneficial in reducing the
likelihood of injury or property loss.”129
Perhaps measuring guns’ social impact requires a more nuanced theoretical
grounding. Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller distill from some gun
rights advocacy—but do not themselves endorse—an argument that guns define a
“marketplace of violence”130 just as speech, in Justice Holmes’s famous formulation,
defines a marketplace of ideas.131 Under the “marketplace of violence” theory, vio-
lence is an inevitable social fact; the state has no actual or legal monopoly on violence;
and guns’ proliferation, deterrent effect, and actual use by law-abiding citizens helps
maximize individuals’ and society’s safety.132 One variation on this theory posits
124 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620 (2008) (identifying self-defense
as the “core lawful purpose” of the Second Amendment).
125 See The Challenges of Defining and Measuring Defensive Gun Use, RAND CORP.
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/essays/defensive-gun-use
.html [https://perma.cc/4RJA-QE26].
126 See David Hemenway & Sara J. Solnick, The Epidemiology of Self-Defense Gun Use:
Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Surveys 2007–2011, 79 PREVENTIVE MED.
22, 23 (2015).
127 See id. at 24. Curiously, self-defensive gun users were less likely than users of other
self-protective methods to be injured before taking self-protective action. Overall pre- and
post-action injury rates for self-defensive gun users were virtually identical to the rates for
victims who took no self-protective action at all. See id.
128 See id.
129 Id. at 22. One prominent older study purported to show that legal promotion of gun
ownership dramatically reduced crime. See generally JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS
CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (1998). Methodological criticisms,
however, discredited that study’s conclusions. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shoot-
ing Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1200–02 (2003);
see also TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 87, 92–95 (describing the controversies around Lott’s work).
130 BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 8, at 155.
131 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
132 See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 8, at 154–59 (explaining and analyzing the “mar-
ketplace of violence” argument).
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that gun ownership, properly viewed as a civic responsibility, produces major posi-
tive externalities by fostering a social order in which the proliferation of guns
prevents crime.133
The marketplace metaphor does not help the Second Amendment satisfy the
benefit criterion. To begin with, the metaphor presents serious problems even in its
source role as a justification for free speech. Portraying public discourse as a market-
place exaggerates the atomized and individual qualities of speech at the expense of
its collective social and political functions.134 The marketplace metaphor also conceals
the extent to which the social reality of public discourse favors entrenched power
structures.135 Adapting the metaphor to the Second Amendment only compounds its
failings. Justice Holmes invoked “the competition of the market” as a normatively
preferable outlet for the “fighting faiths” that validate “[p]ersecution for the expression
of opinions.”136 In contrast, the “marketplace of violence” posits exactly what Holmes
sought to banish—the willful use of force to distribute and arrange social and political
power. An advocate for gun rights might respond that the “marketplace of violence”
correctly takes violence as unavoidable and enlists law-abiding gun users to make
the best of an unfortunate reality. Nothing we know about guns and crime, however,
suggests that a regime of private gun ownership produces anything resembling an
optimal societal outcome. Moreover, that argument foists off on cruel fate the choices
human beings make to advance their desires through force. Some degree of violence
is surely inevitable, but how much violence any society must endure is just as surely
contingent. The economic marketplace generates wealth, and the “marketplace of ideas”
generates knowledge. The “marketplace of violence” generates injury and death.
Heller claims that the Framers of the Second Amendment performed a balancing
of interests to reach a constitutionally binding conclusion that gun rights provide a
net social benefit.137 For reasons discussed above, that claim makes little sense as a
matter of historical fact or constitutional interpretation. It makes no greater sense as
a normative justification for the individual Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms. The assumption that expression brings net social benefits is at least reason-
able. The same assumption about guns falls somewhere between highly implausible
and absurd.
133 See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Right to Arms and the American Philosophy of Freedom,
FIRST PRINCIPLES, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/political-pro
cess/report/the-right-arms-and-the-american-philosophy-freedom [https://perma.cc/EC54-USW2]
[hereinafter Lund, The Right to Arms].
134 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, at 73–75 (criticizing Justice Holmes’s Abrams dissent
for excessive individualism).
135 See generally Ingber, supra note 95 (discussing how the “marketplace” conception skews
First Amendment law in favor of established power structures).
136 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
137 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (asserting that the Second
Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”).
448 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:429
2. The Equality Criterion
Expression satisfies the equality criterion because the capacity to engage in social
relation speech is something that the vast majority of people and groups possess in
roughly equal measure. Societal and legal interventions end up making expression
much less egalitarian than it might be, but core First Amendment doctrine still has
substantial reason to view expression as more egalitarian than most forms of non-
expressive action.138 That reasoning does not work for guns. Almost everyone is
born with the capacity to speak and to listen, free of charge. No one is born with a gun,
and guns cost money. The Heller self-defense justification for the Second Amend-
ment implies that legal allowance for the private possession of guns corrects a social
power imbalance between criminals and crime victims. As discussed above in con-
nection with the benefit criterion, evidence that guns empower crime victims is
sparse.139 Seeing how guns create and exacerbate power imbalances is much easier.
Guns, far more than words, skew the playing field. A person who starts out
silent can generally respond to a verbal challenge. A person who starts out unarmed,
or who wishes not to live in a condition of escalating violence, is always subordinate
to an armed antagonist. The Second Amendment empowers people who choose to
arm themselves over people who choose not to. Even if we somehow discount the
choice not to keep and bear arms,140 some people can afford more reliable, accurate,
and lethal weapons than others. Even assuming that everyone should arm them-
selves, and that everyone can somehow achieve equal firepower, the Second Amend-
ment accords greater power to aggressors who choose to strike first. An armed
society is a petri dish of perverse incentives. Unlike speech, a capacity that society
generally wants people to use, the socially optimal state of the Second Amendment
right is that no one actually shoots. Not even the National Rifle Association (NRA)
openly advocates a society in which hot lead flies constantly through the air. But
why does one keep and bear a gun if not for the ultimate purpose of firing it? Even
if we conceive of keeping and bearing arms in deterrent terms, those less inclined
to shoot—those more readily deterred—will always have sound reason to fear those
more inclined to shoot.141 People more psychologically prone to aggression and
more confident in their legal entitlement to use force will always benefit most from
the power of guns.
138 See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
140 The Second Amendment itself should cause us to credit the choice not to keep or bear
arms as surely as the opposite choice to keep and bear arms. See generally Joseph Blocher,
The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012).
141 As one commentator frames the issue, a regime of “private arms possession might put
citizens in a prisoner’s dilemma,” in which the proliferation of guns creates risks that you will
shoot me and thus creates incentives for me to shoot you first. See Michael Steven Green,
Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 131, 138 (2008).
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To this point I’ve been talking about the power dynamic of the Second Amend-
ment in terms of generic “people.” In reality, that power dynamic breaks down along
stark lines of race and sex. In extending the right to keep and bear arms to constrain
state gun regulations, the Supreme Court spoke in righteous terms about how guns
protected African American freedmen from racist violence after the Civil War.142
That selective history obscures the massive role that guns play in larger and more
dominant groups’ subordination of smaller and more marginal groups.143 We can call
this phenomenon “gun bias.” The contemporary gun rights movement, dominated by
the NRA, is an overwhelmingly white and male political force.144 The “self-defense”
justification for gun rights, promoted by the NRA and embraced by the Heller Court,
resonates with a persistent American pathology: white fear of black crime.145 “Stand
Your Ground” and “Castle Doctrine” laws, among the NRA’s most fervent legisla-
tive priorities, promote white racial privilege146 without actually deterring crime.147
Gun bias carries over from legislation to law enforcement. White men can saunter
through public spaces, flaunting high-powered rifles in “open carry” protests, while
police attack lawful black gun owners as criminals.148 Unchecked gun violence ravages
communities of color even as white enclaves go about their peaceful affairs.149
142 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775–76 (2010).
143 See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
144 The NRA does not report demographic information on its members. Although political
affiliation correlates only roughly with race and sex, we can gain some insight from the finding
that 24% of Republicans and Republican leaners belong to the NRA, while only 11% of Demo-
crats and Democratic leaners do. See PARKER ET AL., supra note 85, at 14. At the same time,
77% of NRA members are Republicans or Republican leaners. See Parker, supra note 88.
145 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
146 See Mario L. Barnes, Taking a Stand?: An Initial Assessment of the Social and Racial
Effects of Recent Innovations in Self-Defense Laws, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3179, 3192–200
(2015) (documenting the disparate racial effects of Stand Your Ground laws).
147 See Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter
Crime or Escalate Violence? Evidence From Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM. RE-
SOURCES 821, 823 (2013) (finding that adoption of Stand Your Ground laws had no deterrent
effect on burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault while actually increasing homicide rates
by 8%); Megan Miller & John Pepper, Assessing the Effect of Firearms Regulations Using
Partial Identification Methods: A Case Study of the Impact of Stand Your Ground Laws on
Violent Crime, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2020) (draft 20–21) (draft on file
with the author) (finding evidence that Stand Your Ground laws increase violent crime and
murder and finding uncertain effects on assault and robbery).
148 See Adam Serwer, The NRA’s Catch-22 for Black Men Shot by Police, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/the-nras-catch-22-for-black
-men-shot-by-police/570124 [https://perma.cc/4LZ6-E785] (critique of rights advocates for
encouraging armed self-defense by African Americans but not defending armed African Ameri-
cans shot by police).
149 See Yolanda T. Mitchell & Tiffany L. Bromfield, Gun Violence and the Minority
Experience, NAT’L COUNCIL ON FAM. REL. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.ncfr.org/ncfr-report
/winter-2018/gun-violence-and-minority-experience [https://perma.cc/5SKA-ZWS2] (discuss-
ing data that show communities of color as disproportionately harmed by gun violence).
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Likewise, while gun rights advocates extol the benefits of guns for vulnerable
women,150 guns in reality cause a dramatic increase in the terror and the body count
of male attacks on female domestic partners.151 Moreover, the NRA has long pushed
restoration of repressive gender hierarchies, rather than gun regulation, as a cure for
gun violence.152 Gun rights advocates masquerade as friends of the powerless, attacking
gun regulation as an elitist project of effete liberalism.153 The realities of gun vio-
lence and gun bias, however, indict the gun culture as a hive of white male power
over everyone else.
Gun rights advocates insist that guns empower minority communities.154 Guns,
by this reasoning, are a great equalizer. Without guns, minority groups are vulnerable
to an oppressive majority’s superior numbers; guns eliminate the majority’s advan-
tage.155 That argument, though, blithely ignores the reality that, in an armed society,
the majority has at least as much access to guns as minorities do.156 The outnum-
bered minority simply becomes the outgunned minority. Consider the decision of
African American civil rights leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, most prominently Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., to pursue a literally disarming strategy of nonviolent resistance
and moral suasion.157 White society today lauds that decision for its principle and
People of color are far likelier than white people to see gun violence as a “very big problem”
nationally (73% of Blacks, 62% of Hispanics, 44% of Whites) and in their local communities
(49% of Blacks, 29% of Hispanics, 11% of Whites). See PARKER ET AL., supra note 85, at 54.
150 See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Not a Second Class Right: The Second Amendment Today, NAT’L
CONST. CTR.: INTERACTIVE CONST., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/in
terpretation/amendment-ii/interps/99#not-a-second-class-right-the-second-amendment-today
-nelson-lund [https://perma.cc/V4SX-BF8H] (asserting that “the most vulnerable people—
including women, the elderly, and those who live in high crime neighborhoods—are among
the greatest beneficiaries of the Second Amendment”).
151 Compilations and discussions of social science evidence on men’s gun violence against
female domestic partners appear in Guns and Violence Against Women: America’s Uniquely
Lethal Domestic Violence Problem, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://
everytownresearch.org/reports/guns-violence-women-americas-uniquely-lethal-domestic-vio
lence-problem/ [https://perma.cc/BD7X-4URX]; Kerry Shaw, 12 Facts that Show How Guns
Make Domestic Violence Even Deadlier, TRACE (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.thetrace.org
/2016/08/domestic-violence-gun-facts/ [https://perma.cc/E3MW-J2TH].
152 See WILLIAMS, supra note 47, at 185–86 (discussing the NRA’s anti-feminist rhetoric).
153 See, e.g., Lund, The Right to Arms, supra note 133, at 14 (assailing “people in the upper
middle class [who] can safely advocate the disarmament of their less fortunate fellow citizens
without fear that such regulations will have any significant effect on themselves”).
154 See WILLIAMS, supra note 47, at 220–41 (discussing and critiquing movements among
subgroups of Jews, women, and African Americans to promote armed self-defense). A recent
exemplar of the argument is CHARLES E. COBB, JR., THIS NONVIOLENT STUFF’LL GET YOU
KILLED: HOW GUNS MADE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT POSSIBLE (2017).
155 See WILLIAMS, supra note 47, at 220–21.
156 See id. at 243.
157 See, e.g., Jon Else, The Civil Rights Movement Had One Powerful Tool that We Don’t
Have, NATION (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-civil-rights-movement
-had-one-powerful-tool-that-we-don’t-have/ [https://perma.cc/89JX-G8WK].
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its decency,158 but the choice of nonviolence also followed pragmatic logic about
how African Americans could most likely achieve political and legal victories over an
entrenched and largely hostile white majority.159 Certainly armed self-defense has
helped African Americans protect themselves against terroristic threats.160 However,
as gun rights advocates rarely acknowledge, the terrorists come armed in the first place.
Armed resistance has emerged only as African Americans’ least bad response. The idea
that a minority group should have access to guns on the same terms as the majority
makes a good deal of sense. That idea animates my proposal below for reconceiving
the Second Amendment.161 The Supreme Court and gun rights advocates, however,
appear to care about gun equality only as a rhetorically convenient incident of a gun
proliferation regime that, in fact, disproportionately harms minority groups. The
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms does not satisfy the equality criterion.
Those concerned with the purposes and effects of the First Amendment’s pro-
tections for expressive freedom might pause to consider how this analysis of the
Second Amendment’s inequitable character reflects back on the current state of First
Amendment law. One way to frame the Supreme Court’s increasingly anti-egalitar-
ian free speech jurisprudence162 is to observe that present First Amendment doctrine
makes speech more like guns. Indeed, Justice Kagan recently excoriated the Su-
preme Court’s conservative majority, in a case that equated making workers pay for
unions’ collective bargaining services with compelled speech, for “weaponizing the
First Amendment.”163 The Roberts Court’s similarly ideologically skewed uses of First
Amendment law to increase the power of wealth in politics,164 to shield commercial
158 That was not always the case. See, e.g., Peniel E. Joseph, America’s Nonviolent Civil
Rights Movement Was Considered Uncivil by Critics at the Time, WASH. POST (July 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/07/04/the-civil-rights-move
ment-might-have-been-nonviolent-but-to-critics-it-was-considered-uncivil/?noredirect=on
&utm_term=.f6270efc8c91 [https://perma.cc/62C6-F8W9] (discussing widespread contempo-
raneous white criticism of the Civil Rights Movement).
159 Strategic thinking about the efficacy of nonviolence permeates the history of the Civil
Rights Movement. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS 1965–68 (2006).
160 See generally, e.g., AKINYELE OMOWALE UMOJA, WE WILL SHOOT BACK: ARMED
RESISTANCE IN THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM MOVEMENT (2013) (discussing armed resistance
in the face of white supremacy).
161 See discussion infra Part III.
162 See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
163 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
164 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 187 (2014) (using the First Amendment to strike
down federal limits on the aggregate amount any person may contribute to federal candidates
in a given election cycle); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S.
721, 722 (2011) (using the First Amendment to strike down a state law that set funding levels
for publicly funded candidates based on the spending levels of their privately funded oppo-
nents); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010) (using the First Amendment to strike
down a federal bar on corporate electoral spending).
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actors from economic regulation,165 and to advantage abortion opponents166 compli-
cates the task of justifying First Amendment speech rights. Perhaps the right to keep
and bear arms inevitably subordinates more than it liberates; but constitutional ex-
pressive freedom can do better. We should deplore and resist a constitutional order
that makes the right to speak up more like the right to shoot down.
The power dynamics of the self-defense justification for the right to keep and
bear arms bring the discussion of justifications for that right full circle, from the non-
political back to the political. The self-defense justification, in failing the equality
criterion, betrays a stronger political polarity than initially appeared when we con-
sidered self-defense as an alternative to the manifestly political anti-tyranny justifi-
cation.167 Even if we reject the idea that the Second Amendment should protect our
capacity to overthrow a tyrannical government, we might accept the idea that the
amendment should empower us to defend ourselves when the government’s law
enforcement apparatus refuses or fails to defend us. However, rendering the right to
keep and bear arms as a constitutional entitlement to armed self-defense serves to
privatize the kind of coercive power that liberal theory axiomatically associates with
the state.168 That move entails a politically momentous revision, or abandonment,
of the liberal social contract.169 The political stakes of the self-defense justification
end up high and fraught.
The attempt to justify the individual right to keep and bear arms in terms of non-
political value does no better than political value justification at validating the parity
premise. The grounds on which our legal culture justifies strong First Amendment
protection for non-political, “social relation” speech170 do not offer an effective tem-
plate for justifying strong Second Amendment protection of the right to keep and
bear arms. Perhaps a better empirical understanding of the world might improve the
Heller Court’s self-defense justification under the benefit and equality criteria; or
perhaps we should assess the self-defense justification under some criteria more
normatively salient than those two; or perhaps a more normatively appealing non-
political justification than self-defense is available to validate the right to keep and
165 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (using the First Amendment to
strike down a state’s bar on pharmaceutical companies’ use of physicians’ patient-prescription
records for marketing drugs).
166 Compare Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 2368, 2371,
2373–75, 2378 (2018) (using the First Amendment to strike down a state law that required
anti-abortion “crisis pregnancy centers” to disclose to patients the nature and limits of the
clinics’ services and the availability of abortion services), with McCullen v. Coakley, 573
U.S. 464, 469, 471, 480–81, 486–87, 497 (2014) (using the First Amendment to strike down
a state-mandated “buffer zone” designed to protect patients at medical facilities that provide
abortion services).
167 See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text.
168 See Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 713, 728 (2011).
169 See id. at 728–32.
170 See discussion supra Section II.A.
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bear arms. On the other hand, perhaps we should recognize that the individual right
to keep and bear arms cannot be justified in anything like the ways we justify the
First Amendment freedom of expression. The parity premise is wrong, and courts
should not enforce the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms with the
same force as the First Amendment’s protections for expressive freedom.
III. AN EQUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
A major problem with the present state of Second Amendment law is the absence
of much linkage between theoretical justification and what courts have actually been
doing.171 If the Second Amendment deserves to be enforced less robustly than the
First Amendment, that doctrinal outcome should take a form that aligns with the
particular justificatory limits on the individual right to keep and bear arms. The Su-
preme Court may soon address this problem, either by commanding stronger en-
forcement of the Second Amendment or by validating weaker enforcement.172 For
now, one form my critical analysis might sensibly lead Second Amendment law to
take is protection not of a substantive right to keep and bear arms against general
government regulation but rather of an equal right to keep and bear arms against
inequitable government regulation. On this construction, courts would treat the
Second Amendment less like the First Amendment and more like the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.173 I will call this formulation the “equal right to arms.”
Some First Amendment scholars,174 joined at times by the Supreme Court,175
have posited a central role for distributive justice in developing the scope and shape
of constitutional expressive freedom. They argue, in essence, that expressive rights
are too important to let the government inequitably distribute opportunities for exer-
cising those rights. The Supreme Court has largely rejected First Amendment equality
arguments, partially due to the Justices’ ideologically driven skewing of First Amend-
ment law toward reinforcement of existing power dynamics176 and partially for the
171 See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 8, at 150–54.
172 See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir.
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019) (No. 18-280).
173 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
174 See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641 (1967); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405
(1986); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 20 (1975). My own writing about the First Amendment has advocated strong attention
to distributive outcomes. See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral
Pathologies, and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1373 (2007).
175 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 308 (1968) (finding a First Amendment right for speakers to access certain private
property generally open to the public), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976);
see also cases cited supra notes 105–06.
176 See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text.
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simpler reason that the First Amendment straightforwardly supports the substantive
protection of expressive rights against government regulation. At least in theory,
ensuring equity in the distribution of a government burden becomes unnecessary
when the government is substantively barred from imposing the burden on anyone.
In contrast, if we cannot justify substantively protecting the right to keep and bear
arms against government regulation, then protecting that right against inequitable
regulation may make sense. On this view, the Constitution should prohibit the gov-
ernment, absent some compelling or substantial reason,177 from disarming particular
people or communities—for example people of color, women, and poor people—in
ways that don’t apply to other people or communities.
The equal right to arms has a template in the “fundamental interest” branch of
equal protection doctrine. Under fundamental interest equal protection, government
denials of equal opportunities to exercise certain especially important, rights and
interests can only survive constitutional challenges if the government can satisfy
heightened scrutiny, even though the Constitution enumerates no protection for those
rights and interests.178 The fundamental interest doctrine thus provides a parallel
track to strict scrutiny for equal protection claims that runs alongside the more familiar
“suspect classification” track.179 The most important and persistent subjects of the
fundamental interest doctrine have been the right to vote180 and the right of access
to judicial process.181 The Court in the 1970s arrested the fundamental interest doc-
trine’s development by refusing to extend the doctrine to rights of material support182
and education.183 Even so, strains of the fundamental interest doctrine resonate in the
Court’s recent recognition of a broad doctrinal basis for same-sex couples’ Four-
teenth Amendment right to marry.184
177 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (discussing the Court’s
failure to establish a standard of review for Second Amendment jurisprudence). In this rough
sketch of a doctrinal proposal, I take no position on whether “equal right to arms” claims would
properly be subject to strict scrutiny or to some less stringent standard or review.
178 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
179 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (striking down on grounds
of sex discrimination a state’s maintenance of a male-only military academy); Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down on grounds of racial discrimination a state’s
racially segregated public education system).
180 See, e.g., Harper, 383 U.S. at 665 (striking down a state poll tax under the Equal
Protection Clause despite the absence in the federal Constitution of any textually explicit
right to vote in state elections).
181 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding under the Equal Protection
Clause that a state must provide an indigent criminal defendant on appeal with a transcript
of the trial or its equivalent).
182 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (rejecting an equal protection
challenge to a state’s imposition of a flat cap on welfare benefits).
183 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973) (rejecting an equal
protection challenge to a state’s reliance on local property taxes to finance public education).
184 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (conceptualizing the right of
same-sex couples to marry in terms of both liberty and equality).
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Transforming the right to keep and bear arms from a substantive protection to
an equality guarantee presents an issue of constitutional interpretation. The equal
right to arms has little to do with the “well regulated Militia” of the Second Amend-
ment’s preamble, and an equality guarantee doesn’t squarely bar the government
from abridging “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” as the Amendment’s
declarative clause appears to require.185 However, when we read the preamble and
the declarative clause together, the equal right to arms stands closer to the text’s
mandate than the Heller right of armed self-defense does. The most straightforward
implication of what this Article has posited as the correct reading of the Second
Amendment is that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” should have no
legal effect in present circumstances.186 Many people could live very easily with that
implication, but many others could not. If we want the Second Amendment to have
legal effect in present circumstances, then courts must either invent a new meaning
for the Amendment, as Heller did, or make some rough compromise with the con-
stitutional text. Aside from my other objections to Heller, I doubt its approach is
sustainable. Over the long run, protection of an enumerated constitutional right seems
unlikely to persist in complete isolation from the text that supposedly enumerates
the right. Rejection of the Heller Court’s invention leaves only textual compromise.
The equal right to arms could emerge from either of two textual strategies. First,
we could construe the Second Amendment as directly commanding the equitable
approach. On this understanding, the Second Amendment’s protection for “the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms” in present circumstances presumptively bars
the government from disadvantaging discrete persons’ or groups’ capacity to arm
themselves.187 Second, we could acknowledge the Second Amendment itself as ves-
tigial but treat it as making “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” suffi-
ciently important to warrant protection under the Equal Protection Clause. These
textual strategies have parallel strengths and weaknesses. The Second Amendment
strategy keeps protection for the right to keep and bear arms located in the textual
provision that enumerates that right, but it requires a conceptual leap to get from that
text to an equality right. Conversely, the equal protection strategy has no conceptual
problem fitting a new equality right into a longstanding equality doctrine, but it leaves
the Second Amendment itself as little more than an artifact. On balance, I think the
equal protection strategy works more directly and clearly. The equal protection strat-
egy might seem to make an interpretive move similar to Professor Amar’s gambit,
which I’ve criticized, of locating a substantive individual right to keep and bear arms
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.188 However, merely
185 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
186 See Magarian, supra note 5, at 99.
187 Cf. BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20
(2015) (suggesting, based on the Second Amendment’s central concern with military power,
that the Amendment today means only “that all qualified persons . . . enjoy an equal right”
to serve in the U.S. military) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188 See discussion supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
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giving a new dimension to an established equality doctrine would require far less
invention, and would raise far lesser legal and practical concerns, than creating a
new unenumerated, substantive right.
An equal right to arms would raise several challenging doctrinal questions.
What would constitute an impermissibly inequitable regulation of firearms? The
racially specific disarming of African Americans during Reconstruction provides an
easy example,189 but present equal protection doctrine would reject that sort of regu-
lation as a suspect classification, making resort to the fundamental interest principal
unnecessary. What about a generally applicable regulation, like a municipal handgun
ban, challenged as disproportionately affecting a discrete group, like residents of high-
crime neighborhoods? Perhaps a court could sustain an as-applied challenge to such
a regulation or even order the government to deploy its public safety resources more
equitably. Doesn’t every gun regulation apply inequitably in some meaningful sense?
To state the problem more broadly: In a society already permeated with guns,
wouldn’t a constitutional mandate of equal access to firearms push against any
conceivably effective firearm regulation, because no such regulation could succeed
in restricting everyone’s access to guns? Conversely, wouldn’t even the most perfect
realization of the equal right to arms sustain the power imbalance that favors people
with a greater propensity for aggression?
These are all important questions for which I lack precise answers. In general,
I suspect that the conceptual challenges of an equal right to arms would play out
along similar lines to the arguments we see in current Second Amendment doctrine,
even aside from the likelihood that most state legislatures would continue to protect
ever more extravagant conceptions of gun rights. Courts would develop the equal
right to arms in light of broader political arguments about the social costs of firearms
and the value of owning them. More important than any doctrinal change is the
persistence of deeply challenging social conditions: The United States is practically
drowning in guns,190 and our government seems incapable of providing enough
security against violence to eliminate our fervor—however reasonably or unreason-
ably grounded—for armed self-defense. Compared to the Heller-McDonald regime
of substantive Second Amendment rights,191 the constitutional stakes of the equal
right to arms would start out considerably lower. The shift to an equality approach
would make figuring out the formidable social problems related to guns and gun
violence less about constitutional abstraction and more about policy judgment. That
would be at least a small step in the right direction.
189 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 771–73 (2010).
190 U.S. civilians own more than 393 million legal and illegal guns, or about six guns for
every five people. See AARON KARP, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, BRIEFING PAPER, ESTIMATING
GLOBAL CIVILIAN-HELD FIREARMS NUMBERS at 3–4 (June 2018), http://www.smallarmssur
vey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9S3R-5Y2T].
191 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
The political process provides the paradigmatic justification for the First Amend-
ment’s protection of free expression.192 That sort of justification is not available for
the recently minted Second Amendment individual right to keep and bear arms,
because the idea that the Second Amendment licenses armed insurrection against a
tyrannical government goes too far.193 If we try instead to justify gun rights along the
same lines we follow to justify constitutional protection for non-political speech, we
run into different problems. Constitutionally protected speech broadly satisfies two
normative criteria: it provides net societal benefits, and most people begin with a
roughly equal capacity to use it.194 The right to keep and bear arms satisfies neither
the benefit criterion nor the equality criterion. As to benefit, the keeping and bearing
of arms appears likely to yield a net societal harm.195 As to equality, the keeping and
bearing of arms reinforces and exacerbates inequities in power.196 The inability to
justify the Second Amendment like the First Amendment suggests that the Second
Amendment does not warrant the same vigorous enforcement as the First Amend-
ment. One way to reconcile the Second Amendment with this failure of justification
would be to treat it as a different sort of right than the First Amendment—a right
that does not guarantee substantive protection against government regulation but
rather mandates equality in regulation.197 Construing the Second Amendment to
protect an equal right to arms would diminish the amendment’s scope in absolute
terms, but it might free the amendment to make the sort of positive contribution to
our constitutional and political order that the First Amendment historically has made.
192 See discussion supra Section I.A.
193 See discussion supra Section I.B.
194 See discussion supra Section II.A.
195 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
196 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
197 See discussion supra Part III.
